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1INTROI)UCTION
All households  see some  fluctuation  in their incomes  over time.  Many have access to
consumption-smoothing  devices  such as savings and borrowing  that allow them to maintain
relatively  stable living standards. But the poor tend to have fewer reserves  beyond what is
needed  to survive lean periods during normal  years and also less access to credit. An
unfavorable  turn of events, particularly  an unexpected  one or even a series of small shocks,
can be catastrophic. Poor people's exposure  to downside  risk in their living standards  can also
bring adverse long-term  consequences  from the depletion  of their productive  assets at times of
distress and the adoption  of costly risk avoidance  strategies.'
V'ietnam  is no exception. The country remains  an agricultural  economy  with a large
share of the population  relying almost  exclusively  on family-run  self-subsistence  farms. Their
incomes are subject to the vagaries  of the weather, disease, and other unexpected  events.
Transition  to a market economy  has stimulated  strong growth in many parts of the country
since the late 1980s and continued  broad-based  growth will help raise living standards  for most
people. But the country is starting  from an extremely  low base with extensive  poverty and
underdeveloped  institutional  structures. Many people will continue  to be poor and most will
remain vulnerable  to risk in the foreseeable  future. Some  people will be slower to respond to
market incentives  and others will face catastrophic  shocks, including  those who respond
quickly t:o  market incentives. Households  also confront shifting  levels of productivity  and
needs over their life cycle.
Many of these issues were of less concern under the former command  economy  where
lack of mobility  ensured  close community  and family solidarity  and where households
2belonged  to local cooperatives  that provided  for the welfare of their members. Developing
safety  nets and redistributive  transfers  to replace these faltering  institutions  is an important  part
of the successful  transition  to a market economy.
Government  intervention  is often recommended  to help protect the poor from the
consequences  of adverse  events. A reliable and effective  system of safety nets can help to
prevent greater impoverishment,  social and political  dislocation, famine,  massive  migration,
assets divestment, and generally  to preserve the productive  potential  of the local economy.
There is also mounting  empirical  evidence  that by enhancing  the poor's ability to cope with
risk, schemes  which are usually  considered  short-term,  stop-gap  measures  may have important
longer-term  impacts  on productivity  and efficiency. 2 Achieving  these goals can also contribute
to political stability  and income  equity-both  important  concerns of the government  of
Vietnam. Sources  of vulnerability  will differ in their importance  from one region to another
(for example  between  rural and urban areas, and between mountainous  and coastal areas) and
for different  groups of poor households. Expectations  will also differ between poor areas and
those  that are better off.  In order to succeed,  programs will have to be adapted  to local
circumstances. Yet, this can create tensions  with other national objectives,  such as the aim to
treat all Vietnamese  fairly and equally no matter where they live.
Vietnam is improving  its poverty  alleviation  and safety net programs, but much more
must still be done to modify  the design of existing  programs and fill large gaps in the systems
and resources needed to protect Vietnam's poor and vulnerable. One important  need, for
example, is dealing more effectively  with community-level  covariate  shocks  such as natural
3disasters that confront the whole  community. In general,  existing programs aim primarily  to
direct transfers  to certain  groups of the poor rather than to fill an insurance  function.
A number of the salient features  of  the Vietnam  case, as well as the concerns to which
it gives rise, are found elsewhere, such as in other countries  in South East Asia like Laos and
Cambodlia,  and in many poor Sub-Saharan  African  countries. These include a poor population
engaged  primarily in agricultural  pursuits in a risky environment;  a lack of resources; large
regional  disparities  in living standards  and in local resources, and a tendency  for these to be
positively  correlated;  the need to adapt to a changing  and modernizing  economic  system; and
problem[s  and horizontal  inequalities  arising out of a decentralized  system of centrally
mandated,  locally administered  programs.'
This paper uses Vietnam  as a case study in rapidly assessing  the strengths and
weaknesses  of an existing system of transfers and safety  nets. Data are taken to be weak; in
particular, rigorous ex-post  evaluations  of the components  of the existing social security
system  are not available  in time to inform  policy  choices. So the aim is instead  to provide a
broad qualitative  assessment,  also pointing to key issues on which knowledge  needs to
improve.
The paper provides a critical overview  of the existing  public poverty and safety net
progranms  in Vietnam  that aim to help and protect those outside  the formal employment
sectors, notably those in the rural economy  and urban informal  sector. It begins with a brief
examination  of the principal sources of vulnerability  for Vietnamese  households  and what is
known  about household  coping strategies. This is followed  by a description  of the various
transfers and safety nets that are currently  available  to address low incomes  and vulnerability
4for individuals  outside  the formal  employment  system and hence not covered by the
government's  social security benefits. Naturally,  much of the focus is on rural households  and
individuals.
The paper draws on the author's numerous  field visits to Vietnam, meetings with
various Government  ministries in Hanoi, and extensive  discussions  with provincial, district,
and commune  level peoples' committees  and local government  representatives. Additional
insights  come from the results of the 1992-1993  Vietnam  Living Standards  Survey
(VNLSS)-a  nationally  representative,  integrated  household  survey-and  from other studies of
living standards  in Vietnam. Because rigorous evaluations  have not been undertaken, little is
known with certainty  about the actual performance  of existing  programs. Hence, analysts  can
only speculate  (informed  by experience  elsewhere)  on their strengths  and weaknesses  in
protecting  the poor.  The virtues and weaknesses  of the government's  flagship  program-the
"Hunger Eradication  and Poverty  Reduction"  Program (HEPR)-are  highlighted  and an
agenda  for strengthening  the design and implementation  of the main safety  net and transfer
programs is proposed.
SOURCES  OF VULNERABILITY  AND COPING STRATEGIES
The key to designing  effective  policies  for social protection  lies in first understanding
the characteristics  of the poor.  As in many developing  countries, poverty in Vietnam  is a
predominantly  rural phenomenon. Close to 80 percent of Vietnam's population  and 90 percent
of the poor live in rural areas.  The incidence  of rural income  poverty is 57 percent based on
5the cost-of-basic  needs method  using the 1993 Vietnam  Living Standards  (VNLSS)  household
survey data. 4
P'overty  in Vietnam  has a distinctive  regional  dimension. The headcount  index of rural
poverty ranges from a low of 45 percent in the rural South East to a high of 74 percent in the
North Central region.  The South is in general less poor than the North and the coastal and
mountainous  areas of the Center.  Poor regions, especially  mountainous  ones, tend to be the
most disadvantaged  in terms of infrastructure,  remoteness  from market and information
centers, lack of water and water management,  and deficits of food staples. Here markets are
least developed. The majority  of Vietnam's ethnic minorities,  who experience  some of the
most severe poverty, inhabit remote  mountainous  regions.
The center's coastal regions tend to have high population  densities  but poor quality
soils threatened  by encroaching  salinity and acid sulphate  contamination.  They suffer
especially  from frequent natural disasters such as typhoons  and devastating  floods, followed  by
serious bouts of drought. But other regions also experience  water related hazards. It is
estimated  that close to three-quarters  of the country's population  is susceptible  to flooding. 5
Mountainous  areas are prone to flash floods  and landslides,  while the low-lying  river deltas
often experience  severe river flooding  and typhoons.  Moreover, analysis  of trends over time
suggests  that the frequency  and severity  of natural catastrophes  are on the rise as a result of
environmental  degradation. 6
The rural household  economy, and therefore poverty, is intrinsically  related to
agriculture. Agriculture  is the primary occupation  of 84 percent of all rural workers aged 6
years and older.' The highest  incidence  of poverty is found among  farmers. Poor households
6often have abundant potential labor supply relative to other factor endowments, but without
outside employment opportunities,  farm-productivity is driven down to low levels.  The
fundamental cause of poverty for these households is too little land and capital, or too little
non-farm employment, for the number of able-bodied workers.  In many parts of Vietnam,
rural labor markets remain thin and underdeveloped.  Widespread underemployment in
agriculture coupled with seasonality in work and incomes makes poverty particularly acute in
places where few annual cropping cycles are feasible because land or water is scarce.
Still other households are characterized by insufficient labor.  They have less able-
bodied family workers than they need to farm their land, usually because of the demographic
or health circumstances of the family (the result of death, old age, illness, disability of the
breadwinner,  or the presence of many small children).  Debilitating morbidity from infectious
diseases such as malaria and iodine deficiency remains common.  Vietnam also has more than
its share of disabled due to the country's  long history of recent wars.
Poor households typically lack either savings or access to credit.  In Vietnam,  as in
most developing countries, a household's ability to invest in the land or diversify into off-farm
activities depends largely on the availability of its own savings.  Limited amounts of informal
credit are available only at high rates of interest.  The labor surplus thus results in low yields,
in the inability to raise livestock or carry on with sideline activities outside agriculture,  and in
vulnerability to extreme seasonality of incomes and food insecurity.
In addition to a lack of physical capital, the lack of human capital-good  health,  skills
and education-creates  poverty, and is reinforced by it.  Despite Vietnam's efforts to educate
its entire population, many poor households cannot afford the out-of-pocket costs of schooling
7and children remain indispensable  labor inputs for many families. Many ethnic minorities  do
not speak  Vietnamese,  and-particularly among  poor households-have not been to school.
As in education, Vietnam  has achieved  much in raising overall health status. However, child
malnutrition  rates have  been extremely  high, especially  among  the poor.  The prevalence  of
stunting for 25 to 36 month old children  in the poorest two deciles was estimated  to be close to
70 percent in the 1992-93  VNLSS. Low birth weight  was also found to be common  among  the
poor.8
Isolation  from information,  trade and market networks, physical infrastructure, and
market and institutional  structures  (credit, land and labor) tends to limit the opportunities  for
off-farm  diversification  and employment,  and to worsen seasonality  and income variability.
These factors  increase  the vulnerability  of poor households  and weaken  their ability to
withstand  shocks  and smooth  consumption  adequately. The very same factors have prevented
many households  from participating  in the benefits  of market reforms. Meanwhile,  many of
the same  households  also suffered  from some of the reforms in social sector and social welfare
services  provision brought on by the transition.
As in all poor rural agriculture-based  economies,  Vietnamese  households  face a variety
of threats to the stability of their living standards. It is useful to distinguish  between covariate
and idiosyncratic,  as well as unanticipated  and anticipated  sources of income  variability.
Fluctuations  are said to be covariate  when an entire community  or region is simultaneously
affected. Common  examples  in Vietnam  include wars, severe floods, drought, typhoons, crop
pest inFestations,  pre-harvest  lean seasons  and economic  recession  and changes  in the terms of
trade. ][diosyncratic  shocks  affect a single household  or individual  leaving others unaffected.
8The death of the family  breadwinner  or an illness are examples  of idiosyncratic  shocks  that
affect  many households  in Vietnam.
Sources  of vulnerability  differ in importance  from one region to another. 9 For
example, districts in the Central coastal region are extremely  prone to destructive  natural
calamities. In addition, agricultural  production  is often hostage  to 6 months of drought
followed  by floods. In the absence  of improved  water management,  the poor suffer from food
insufficiency  during a good part of each year.  In other regions, malaria and tuberculosis  are
common  ailments  that can temporarily  ruin a household's livelihood.
Individuals  and communities  do take various steps to protect themselves  from living
standards  variability,  but it is important  to understand  the limitations  of these arrangements."
For example, in similar settings  in rural Southwest  China, it has been found that 40 percent of
an income shock is typically  passed on to current consumption  for the poorest decile of the
population."' Covariate  and unanticipated  shocks  are probably the hardest for the poor to cope
with, either by their own means or with community  support. Income fluctuations  that occur as
a result of ordinary seasonality  or old age for example, are readily anticipated, and poor
households  have typically  devised  methods  for coping  with them. But the methods for dealing
even with anticipated  variability  do not always  work well and may have costs in terms of
average  living standards.  Unanticipated  shocks, such as sudden  illness or a crop failure, often
have adverse  consequences  in both the short and long terms and poor households  can do little
to protect themselves  against  them.
Community  and other private arrangements  provide some degree of security to many
households.  For example, Vietnamese  farm households  typically  adopt production strategies
9that help to minimize  both their vulnerability  to natural hazards and the impacts  of disasters.
But there is evidence  that such strategies-with costs to average incomes-coupled with
frequent occurrences  of natural disasters  in certain  regions, are helping to widen regional
inequalities.  12
As reflected in the Vietnamese  idiom "the intact leaf covers the ragged one," various
informal  and quasi-market  community-level  arrangements  are used to help families; for
example, the mass organizations  may arrange to have someone  else work the land for a family
whose breadwinner  is transiently  ill.  Informal  arrangements  might also be made to (in effect)
hire labor in, or rent land out.  Exchanging  labor time among  households,  particularly  to cope
with seasonal  or unexpected  labor shortages, is a time honored tradition in Vietnam.  13
'The  extended  family  remains important  in Vietnamese  culture, which has a strong
Confucian  heritage. An analysis  of the VNLSS reveals  that a large share of Vietnamese
households  either received (44 percent)  or gave (46 percent)  private transfers to other
households. 1
4 In general, transfers flow from the young to the old.  Such private forms of
insurance  tend to be more effective  and reliable for some  among  the vulnerable  in certain
circumstances,  but they are often not available  to the poorest among  the poor and they don't
cope well with covariate  risk and unanticipated  shocks.  They need to be complemented  by
effective  public programs.
Finally, it is important  to note that some informal  social protection  schemes  also exist
in various parts of the country, set up by farmers  or other interest groups  or whole
communities."  Members make regular contributions  and can expect to get insurance  benefits
10in emergencies  and for old-age. However, little is known  about how extensive or how well
such schemes  perform in providing  risk insurance  to their members.
AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING PUBLIC PROGRAMS
A strong and pervasive  view in government  and in mass organizations  is that the
responsibility  for poverty alleviation  must be shared across three key groups: government,  the
community,  and poor people. Problems  cannot be solved  by government  alone; it can act as
the catalyst to mobilize  resources at the local level, but the community  and the poor must bear
some of the responsibility. These  perspectives  are likely to be influenced  and conditioned  by
severe budget  constraints. For, while there is clearly a conviction  that government  has a role
in ensuring equity and that market mechanisms  lead directly  to distributional  inadequacies,
budgetary  resources to deal with these problems  are limited. Thus, a large number of
initiatives  and programs exist or are planned even though resources  are not commensurate  to
government  aspirations. Poverty-related  policy  promulgations  abound, but implementation  and
coverage  relies primarily  on local authorities  and resources, which are rarely adequate. One
result is enormous  variance across  provinces  in assistance  to the poor and vulnerable. Another
is an overwhelming  emphasis  on credit for income-generating  activities  as the way to help the
poor help themselves  and graduate  from poverty.
In 1997, the public social safety net essentially  consisted  of five programs:
1.  The Social Guarantee  Fundfor Veterans  and War Invalids provides
compensation  for those who contributed  to the war effort or suffered  from the
war;
112.  The Social Guarantee  Fundfor Regular Relief gives assistance  to those who
are not able-bodied  or able to partake in productive  activities  including  the
disabled, orphans, and the elderly;
3.  The Contingency  Fundfor Pre-Harvest  Starvation and Natural Disasters
provides contingency  relief to address pain caused  by natural disasters and lean
season starvation;
4.  The National  Development  Programs (14 national development  programs)  are
to some  degree related to promoting  growth and reducing  poverty mainly by
providing  credit for income  generation  at concessional  rates and building
infrastructure  for those households  who are held back by poor physical
infrastructure  and lack of capital.
5.  The Social Security System consisting  of employment-related  social insurance
for formal sector workers.
During 1998 many of these programs (except Social  Security)  were consolidated  into
one national  poverty program-the  "Hunger  Elimination  and Poverty Reduction"  Program
(HEPR)-in  order to better mobilize  and coordinate  antipoverty  resources.
The Scicial  Guarantee  Fund for Veterans  and War Invalids
Centrally  funded programs  of the Ministry  of Labor, Invalids  and Social  Affairs
(MOL]  SA) address the consequences  of Vietnam's recent wars by helping victims and others
who ccintributed  to the national  liberation  struggle. Only those who backed  the winning  side
are potentially  recognized  as victims or worthy of the country's gratitude. Programs  provide
12assistance  for handicapped  war veterans, resistance  fighters and others who aided the war
effort, and help to the families  of fallen soldiers. New schemes, often planned a long time
before the necessary  budgets  become  available, are periodically  announced  and lists of
qualifying  individuals  are prepared  at the commune  level. For example, a 1994 decree honors
heroic mothers:  women who lost an only child or more than 3 family members  including their
husbands  in the 1954-1975  wars. By May 1996, the "heroic  mother" title had been conferred
on 37,000 women. A subsequent  check of the records found, however, that 2,577 of one
round of 2,842 nominees  were already deceased.
Since the last ordinance  announced  in 1994, the number of beneficiaries  from these
programs has risen to nearly  2.4 million.  1 6 Those who qualify  under most of the sub-
categories  in principle receive  cash transfers  on a monthly  basis. Each individual  is allotted
the same amount  from the budget. However, because  the provinces are required to contribute,
total amounts  may differ from one place to another. A few other benefits may also be
available  including  funeral fees and aid to one's family  at death, medical insurance, waivers
for children's school fees and preferential  access to scholarships,  land or housing assistance,
and livelihood  support. In other cases (such as in the heroic mothers decree), a one-time
lump-sum  is provided to help the household  set up a future livelihood. Spending  under
"Veterans  and War Invalids" is also allocated  to building war memorials  and centers for the
disabled and providing  wheelchairs  and artificial limbs for amputees. Each responsible  local
authority  is expected  to make requests  for such expenditures  to MOLISA  and to keep updated
lists of subsidy-deserving  veterans and war invalids.
13Whether  or not these subsidies  will continue  to be given to the families of deceased  war
veterans is likely  to depend  on the budget. Some  war victims-such as agent-orange  affected
children-continue to be born.  There is no set policy and periodic changes  are likely.
The Social Guarantee  Fund for Regular  Relief
The Social  Guarantee  Fund for Regular  Relief aims at helping those-such  as orphans,
the disabled, the insane, and the elderly without  family support-who for reasons unconnected
with the wars are unable to support themselves. They are divided into two groups: those who
are able to go about their day to day lives with support from the community,  and those who
cannot. A monthly stipend  of VND 24,000, often given in the form of rice (10-12  kg), is
stipulated  for the first group, while placement  into specialized  provincial  care centers and a
monthly allowance  of VND 96,000 is available  for the others.  In 1995, 195 social relief
centers e  xisted nationwide.
Commune  and district officials  are responsible  for implementation. They compile  lists
of people who qualify  for regular relief according  to norms dictated by the Center.  For
example, to qualify  because of disability,  one must be unable  to walk and have lost a large part
of one's work capacity. How much, and how exactly  this is defined, may well depend on
available  budgets. Each province  sends it's approved  list to the central  government.
MOLISA, the Ministry of Finance  (MOF), and the Ministry  for Planning and Investment
(MPI) each review  the requests  and make recommendations  to the national  assembly  for a final
decision. Recommendations  and decisions  on transfers are based on various considerations
including  the numbers on the provincial  lists, the population  size and total budget expenditures
14of the province, and its geographical  classification  (mountainous,  delta, etc).  The ministries
place different  weights on different  criteria and are known  to disagree in their
recommendations.
In addition  to providing  subsidies  to the target groups, regular relief transfers from the
central budget  can be used to cover the costs of building, maintaining,  administering,  and
equipping  the centers, and of the rehabilitation,  training  and job placement  of invalids.
Whether  the transferred  funds make allowance  for these expenditures  or are based only on
numbers  of qualifying  individuals  times the subsidy  allotted for each is not clear.
Labor departments  at the district and commune  levels are in charge of distributing
transferred  funds from provincial  budgets  to individuals. Central transfers do not appear to be
sufficient  to cover all those on the lists. Officials  emphasize  the need to be strict about who
qualifies  and to rely on contributions  from the community. A fair amount  of doubt was
expressed  in interviews  about the reliability  of provincial  lists. MOLISA  has supervision
missions  to the provinces  to check lists, and try to reduce them. By their criteria, more people
are placed on the lists than deserve  to be.  Communities  are not usually  able to mobilize  much
and so either the lists or the amounts  must be reduced. It is not known exactly  what happens
then at the district and commune  levels.
In reality, coverage of the target groups  is far from complete. MOLISA  figures for
1993 indicated  that, nationwide,  only 10 percent of orphans, 21 percent of the "lonely"
elderly, and 5 percent of the disabled  population  actually  received  program benefits.  1
7 In
addition, tremendous  variance is evident across regions both in numbers  and in the share of the
eligible who are covered. How these figures, and in particular  the denominator,  were defined
15is unknown. One explanation  for the exceedingly  low coverage  is MOLISA's more generous
criteria versus the national  assembly's  final appropriations. The low coverage  may also reflect
the public  budget constraint-although that cannot  explain the variance across regions-or  the
fact that take-up  may be low and varies due to different  local program stipulations. Another
possibility  is that the poor coverage  of this program reflects some  substitutability  with local
forms of assistance.
The monitoring  of how much money  actually goes to those on the lists is also weak and
is reflected  in complaints  from the grassroots  to the central  govermnent  and in numerous
corruption  scandals. Some  of the problems  arise from infrequent  reevaluation  of the lists.  For
example, a beneficiary  may move  to another province, register with his or her new locality's
Labor Department,  and be granted a new certificate. The Labor Department  in the old
provirLce  has an incentive  to leave  the person on the rolls for as long as possible. Laxity in
checking  for this kind of duplication  reinforces  powerful incentives  for maximizing  the number
of names on the lists.
The Contingency  Fund for Pre-harvest  Starvation  and Natural Disasters
For a long time, the Government  of Vietnam  has helped  localities  deal with the
consequences  of catastrophic  events such as natural disasters  and difficult  pre-harvest  periods.
In the past when a natural calamity  occurred, MOLISA  would  dispatch a team to assess the
damage  and discuss the situation  and estimated  level of required help before a final decision on
aid was taken. This process tended  to take a long time. It order to expedite it, the
government  began in 1994 to encourage  each province  to set up a relief or "Contingency"
16Fund (CF) for dispensing  emergency  relief and starvation  relief for natural disasters and inter-
crop hungry periods. This small fund is not meant  to fully cover needs but rather to provide a
reserve that allows  the provinces  to move quickly in an emergency. When more is needed, the
province is expected  to mobilize  local contributions,  and can also make a special request from
the central government. Roughly  60 percent of provinces  make proposals for additional  funds
each year.  MOLISA  reviews  the requests  and funds about 30 percent.  Use of the money is
largely at the discretion  of the province, although  the Center provides guidelines. Each
province's Department  of Labor oversees  the funds and allocates  them directly  to people in
affected  districts.
National  Development  Programs
Fourteen national development  programs are classified  as poverty  programs that target
areas of national  priority.  Many of these only indirectly  impact  poverty alleviation, although
some  of their components  are poverty-oriented. Taken as a whole, these programs represent
an important  source of funding  for communes-estimated  at 27 percent of average  commune
level non-salary  recurrent costs by one source.' 8 To some degree, the programs also
redistribute  resources to poorer provinces. The National  Programs encompass  reforestation
and coastal  reforestation;  job creation;  provision of credit; family planning; health care,
disease  control, and education  programs; and support to minority and ethnic groups and
mountainous  areas.  The funds for these programs come from the budget and from grants or
preferential  loans from international  organizations.
17Two of the larger programs-Program 120 (employment  promotion)  and Program 327
(reclamation  of barren hills and waste land and settlement  of ethnic minorities)-are
considered important  in poverty alleviation. Both have large credit components.  Initially,
much of the effort and resources of Program 120  were focused  on labor restructuring  and
retraining laid-off state enterprise  employees. Over time, an increasing  share of the funds
have gone to "credit for employment  creation" with local peoples' committees  and mass
organizations  in charge of dispensing  loans. In 1995, 80 percent of the program's funds went
to providing subsidized  credit. Program 327 is also geared to financing  loans, primarily for
sustainable  agriculture and forestry management  projects. Twenty other sub-programs  are also
directed at providing  preferential  credit to the households.  Much of the rest of program 327's
budget is devoted to developing  complementary  infrastructure  in new settlement  areas.
Reviews  of the National  Programs  conclude  that there is considerable  room for
improvement  in cost-effectiveness.  Shortcomings  can largely be blamed on the Center's
inadequate  control and monitoring  of within-province  budgetary  allocations and the selection
of projects and loan recipients.' 9
Consolidation  Under  a National  Hunger  Elimination  and Poverty  Reduction  Program
In 1996  the government  proposed  a national hunger elimination  and poverty reduction
(HEPR) program to coordinate  existing and new efforts, as well as the resources for
combating  poverty.  The impetus for the national  HEPR arose out of the growing recognition
of dravwbacks  in the country's current approach  to poverty alleviation. These include: 1) the
lack of integration  between existing  programs leading to a lack of coordination  between
18policies and a diffusion of resources; 2) the heavy emphasis on credit and relative neglect of
education, training, health care and infrastructure development; 3) the lack of national poverty
standards; and 4) lack of an effective mobilization of the community behind the poverty
reduction efforts.
The national program takes its cue in part from the provinces.  Following the lead of
Ho Chi Minh City in the early 1990's, 44 provinces set up HEPR Funds as a way of
coordinating (local and central) activities, resource mobilization, and spending.  Again, most
of the funds'  activities have centered on granting loans with preferential  interest rates to help
individuals set up businesses.  Considerable variance has continued to exist across provinces
both in who gets assistance and how they are assisted because the selection of beneficiaries has
only been partly determined by the central government's  stipulations and guidelines and
because of differences in local capacity to supplement central funds. The government
responded by drawing up plans for better coordination of activities and standardization of
norms across localities by means of a national umbrella HEPR program.
The national program intends to provide an integrated policy and planning framework
and coordinate efforts across different sectors and ministries.  For example, the National
Programs and other sectoral sub-programs (such as run by the Health or Education Ministries)
that were directed at the poor have now been incorporated into the HEPR.  A few additional
programs are also planned including: jobs for the disabled; help for agent-orange affected
children; and help for the elderly without family support.  The national program subsumes
regular relief that previously targeted these groups but was only able to meet part of their
needs.  HEPR activities to help poor households in the period 1998 to 2000 include:
191.  Land and production  policies  for the poor.  The government  estirnates  that
close to 6 percent of farming households  now live in poverty due to a lack of land. Efforts will
be made to redistribute  unused or inappropriately  distributed  commune  land, or to move
willing households  to new economic  zones. Provincial  and district governments  are
responsible  for ensuring  that all households  are adequately  endowed  with land.
2.  Micro-credit  for income-generation  at concessional  rates. Approximately  30
percent of poor households  have already been provided  with credit from various sources.
However, the poorest households  were often denied  access to these loans. The goal is for 90
to 95 percent of households  identified  as poor to have unconditional  access to loans to improve
their production. Responsibility  for providing  financial  services  to the poor lies with the
newly established  Bank for the Poor.
13.  Vocational  training and technology  transfer for poor households  and their
children.  Voluntary  groups  will be dispatched  to help the poor with business  undertakings  and
technology  transfer in production  activities  in poverty areas.  Scholarships  and other education
stipends  are planned for talented  children  from poor households.
4.  Infrastructure in poor communes. A. survey  by the Ministry of Construction
identified  1,160 out of 10,000 communes  as suffering  particularly  acutely from a lack of
infrastructure. The HEPR program plans to develop  infrastructure  in these communes,
focusingr  on roads, electricity, safe water supply, primary and secondary  schools, health care
centers and communal  market places.
5.  Education and health care  for the poor.  Programs are planned for extending
fee exernptions  for poor children in primary and secondary  school along with help with
20textbooks  and other supplies, and possibly stipends  for the extremely  poor.  Financial
incentives  will be given in view of filling teaching  posts in remote mountainous  areas.
Similarly,  fee exemptions  will be extended  for health  care.  Other programs in the health care
area-population and family  planning, malaria, goiter, immunization-will also be coordinated
through  the HEPR.
6.  Support  for the disabled  and elderly  poor, and for victims  of natural disasters.
HEPR will aim to help all the poor without  a capacity  to support themselves. Free health care
and other support enabling  participation  in the community  will be provided. One million  poor
disabled individuals  are expected  to be targeted  through  this program. The HEPR program
also controls a special  fund for helping  those who are affected  by natural disasters.
7.  Other initiatives.  A number  of other schemes  targeted to women and ethnic
minorities,  and aimed at promoting  employment  (including  through  public works schemes  and
subsidized  micro-credit),  and protecting  the environment,  also fall under the HEPR umbrella.
The government  estimates  that about VND 10,000 billion or close to US$1 billion are
needed to achieve  these objectives  over the 1998  to 2000 period. About one third of the
funding  is projected  to come from the central  government  budget; 4 percent from local
government  budgets; the largest amount, 43 or so percent of the total, is to be mobilized
through  mandatory  (37.5 percent)  and voluntary  (5.8 percent)  local contributions;  while the
rest will come from international  organizations  and through  integration  with central and local
socio-economic  programs. 20 Much of the money will be distributed  to provinces  through a
variety of financing  methods such as loans  and grants.  Provided  this target is achieved,  the
government  predicts that hungry households  will be a thing of the past while poor households
21will decline from 17.7 percent in 1998 to 10 percent by the year 2000.  Funding will be
allocated  primarily  to infrastructure  building (38 percent of the total budget), the provision of
credit (27 percent), and resettlement  (12 percent). 2'
HEPR documents  also emphasize  greater decentralization  of implementation  and active
national  participation. Activities  include  awareness  campaigns  to motivate  solidarity and
mobilize  charitable contributions  and other forms of participation  from the population. The
government  promotes  HEPR as a "national  endeavor" in the revolutionary  tradition of Ho Chi
Minh to eliminate  hunger and raise the living standards  of millions  of Vietnamese. Much of
this rhetoric reflects the government's  political  commitment  to raising living standards  for all,
a widespread  societal  concern with rising inequity,  and the reality of tight budget constraints.
The program was approved  by the national  assembly  and an Executive  Board
established  in April 1998. Surveys  will now be conducted  to establish  a registry of poor
households  at the commune  level.  Each identified  poor household  will then be given a book
that ceItifies their status. This will be valid for as long as they are poor.  Local authorities
will check this yearly. Possession  of this book then qualifies  the household  for loans, training,
fee exemptions,  and so on.  Without  the book, households  can not participate  in the programs.
Other programs will continue, although  it is not clear in what capacity.
CHALLENGES  FOR IMPROVING  VIETNAM'S  SAFETY  NET
Reforms  of the current poverty alleviation  and safety net system as embodied  by the
national  HEPR do not propose a change in policy focus. The identified  policy areas have all
been emphasized  in the past and were addressed  by some of the larger programs  discussed
22earlier, as well as through a variety of ad hoc schemes.  In terms of funding and priorities,  it
is clear that the primary focus of HEPR is micro-finance and infrastructure development.
Whether or not it will reach the poorest,  address all sources of vulnerability,  and attack them
in the most cost-effective manner is open to debate, but answers are not readily available.
Judgements about the adequacy of existing policies must await, and be based on, careful
evaluations.  The potential immediate significance of the HEPR lies in the possibility of
greater consistency in priorities and norms, better monitoring of outcomes, much needed
integration and coordination between programs, better coverage of the poor,  and redistribution
towards poorer and less administratively capable provinces.
National  standards
The HEPR aims to help the hungry and very poor.  MOLISA has been responsible for
the criteria used to determine who and how many are hungry and poor in different regions.
Since the period of high inflation in the 1980s the government expresses poverty criteria  in
rice equivalents at local prices. The national criteria define the "starving"  as those with the
income per capita equivalent of less than 13 kg of rice per month in rural areas and 15 kg in
urban areas; and "the poor" as those with less than 25 kg in urban areas, 20 kg in rural delta
and midland areas, and 15 kg in rural mountainous areas.  Based on these criteria, MOLISA
estimated that in 1997 4.1 percent of all households (598,746 households) were starving and
16.2 percent were poor (2,347,133 households).
These are general criteria for the country, which have in theory been used to identify
beneficiaries of transfer and safety net programs.  In practice, they can and are altered to take
23specific  province  characteristics  into consideration. Provinces  currently enforce the principle
of "relal:ive  standards"  whereby  the wealthier  provinces  establish  higher criteria to allow for
the fact that the average  of everyone  is higher though poverty still exists.  For example, the
Mekong delta with relatively  high incomes,  uses a locally  more acceptable  income equivalent
of 30 kg.  Poverty cut-off  points are also influenced  by available  resources. For example, Ho
Chi Minh City's poverty standards  are much higher than those  proposed by MOLISA. In
1992, this was US$50/yr/per  cap in rural areas, US$100  in urban areas.  Since then, the line
appears  to have been raised as often as yearly-not  to cover cost of living increases  but
because resources have grown. As of January 1996, it had been raised to $200 for rural areas
and $250 in urban areas.  Yet the number  of poor households  has not changed. Relative
poverty considerations  appear to have considerable  influence  on allocations.
Since different  standards  of "poverty"  are used in different  places, there will be uneven
coverage  and leakage. The poorest in Vietnam  often need to rely on charity from the
community. But they often live in poor communities  in poor areas, where other households
have little to spare.  Coverage  among  Vietnam's poor appears  likely to be quite uneven
spatially, with poor people living in poor areas faring much worse than poor people in well-off
areas.  iOf  course, higher poverty lines do not imply that more of the poor are covered or that
all below the line are covered. Indeed, a higher poverty line may simply  allow more of those
higher up on the income scale to be covered. There is a role for a central authority such as the
national  government  to establish  and enforce  a national  minimum  standard  below which none
is allowed  to fall.  This is then an important  determinant,  along with information  on local
resources, of central transfer allocations  to the regions earmarked  for distribution  to the poor.
24The HEPR provides the institutional  means for standardizing  poverty lines and
ensuring consistency  of poverty comparisons  and hence policy across provinces. Ideally, this
will involve some  rethinking  of current definitions  of absolute  poverty and the establishment  of
a national  consensus  on minimum  norms. For example, the current criteria need to better
allow for spatial  cost of living differences  and varying  levels of access  to public and publicly-
provided  private goods.
How much decentralization  is optimal?
As in the past, under the current system the poor are identified  at the local level, by the
commune  chairman  and mass organizations  such as the women's union, the veterans group,
and farmers' associations. These local authorities  decide who qualifies  for programs and
dispense  aid, including  micro-credit. There appears  to be little checking  of the outcomes  of
this process and the scant  evidence  there is suggests  that provincial  lists of poor are not
reliable.
There are clear advantages  to relying on local knowledge. The chairman  and mass
organizations  are likely to know commune  households  intimately  and to be able to detect
changes  in levels of living standards  over time. But there may be drawbacks  as well.  Even
when national  criteria are established,  incentives  are for localities  to stack the lists of
qualifying  individuals  in order to maximize  transfers. Bias may occur from the preferences  and
agendas  of those-including the commune  chairman  and mass organizations-who determine
the lists at the local level. It is presumably  in the interests  of the women's union, busy
aggressively  campaigning  for family  planning, for example, to favor households  practicing
25family planning  in its' distribution  of concessional  loans for poverty reduction. The local
authorities  are often very powerful, and political  favoritism  and other abuse of power almost
certainly  leads to biases on the lists.22
Increasing  mobility  of households  also poses new challenges. It is likely that many of
the poor will benefit  from migration  (although  the poorest may not have the skills, or be able
to afford to move). Mobility  is likely to help in cases of covariate  risk, but not in dealing with
idiosyncratic  risk.  Indeed, increasing  mobility within Vietnam  is likely  to create problems
with the current system  of poverty  relief.  The system  is based  heavily on local targeting in
communities  where everyone  knows everyone  and what their income sources and resources
are.  w'ith mobility, it is clearly  more difficult  to know who is really poor and avoid problems
of adverse selection  and moral hazard. Mass organizations  are more inclined  to favor
househoDlds  who are more permanent  and likely  to reciprocate  in the future. Unless households
are registered  residents, the local authorities  can simply  ignore them. There is increasing
seasonal  and permanent  migration  to cities as well as other non-urban  areas.  Ho Chi Minh
City had an estimated  1 million  unregistered  people in 1996. Workers come from far away
provinces  and because many criteria exist for becoming  a registered and legal resident, they
stay unregistered  and without any kind of social security. Many jobs require official
registration  as do schools, health  care facilities  and other public services. Errors in identifying
the poor are inevitable,  and this problem is likely to increase.
The current social security system  may also impede  mobility. It could have large
efficiency  costs if the threat of less community  assistance  and loss of safety net benefits
dissuades  households  from moving. 23 A highly decentralized,  community-based  safety-net
26may well create spatial poverty traps.  Evidence of such poverty traps has been found in
Southern China in areas across the border from Vietnam. 24 However, little is known about
what role the institutional arrangements for social protection might play in fostering the
conditions for spatial poverty traps.
In the future, local authorities and the mass organizations should have less discretion in
defining who is poor.  The advantages of decentralization come at a disadvantage of horizontal
inequity.  There is a clear tension here that the government must consider in designing the
HEPR.  One way to deal with this issue is by redistributing and ensuring correct allocations
across areas based on standardized information about needs, performance, and outcomes. This
requires a highly disaggregated national data base on indicators of living standards that is
comparable over time and updated frequently.  The collection of panel data-which  follows the
same households and communities over time-can  be used to test and monitor the performance
of interventions.  Provided panel data exist, models are available for evaluating how well the
safety net performs dynamically including how well it protects against poverty distinguished
from how well it promotes out of poverty. 25 Information on who the poor are and monitoring
of who makes claims, who receives benefits, levels of social relief disbursements and
outcomes needs to be strengthened.  Attention must be given to the design of rules for
implementation at the local level, taking account of incentive effects while exploiting the
greater capacity of local communities to know who is poor. The rules should be standardized
nationally. In addition, criteria for eligibility should be transparent and widely publicized.
Making the lists of selected beneficiaries public may then help to overcome political
maneuvering.
27With increasing  mobility  in the future, the capacity for local areas to make these
decisions  will likely diminish. New  pressures  will be put on the Center to allocate  according
to non-geographic characteristics.  Although geographical effects on poverty will remain
important, the ability to achieve national objectives through local intervention will diminish
because of mobility.  However, this could still be a long way off.  In the meantime,  responses
should aim to reduce the costs of migration  and make registration  simpler. High costs of
migration  are probably not in the interest of the poor nationally.
Once well-defined  rules for delineating  recipients  have been instituted  for all programs
and regions, it will be easier to coordinate  between  programs and integrate  objectives  so as to
maximize  the impact  and coverage  of resources. The criteria for allocating  relief across
provinces remains haphazard.  Each program is subject to different rules and many are
implemented  by different  ministries. Outcomes  are unlikely  to be optimal from the point of
view of reducing  poverty. Methods  used for determining  provincial  needs and transfer
amounts need to be standardized across ministries or the responsibility relegated to a specific
ministry.
Implementing  an integrated, national  safety net will probably entail greater spatial
redistribution. Resources  are extremely  limited. One objective  of poverty and safety net
program proponents must be to increase budget allocations for promoting and protecting the
poor.  Another equally important and perhaps more feasible option in the short term is to
ensure that the little there is goes to the neediest  households. There are currently clear gaps in
coverage. Vulnerable  households  in poor areas are less well served than others by the existing
arrangernents. The national HEPR also provides  hope for provinces  worst hit by natural
28calamities  and most prone to a hungry lean season. The institutionalization  of workable
national  norms and better monitoring  systems  will help towards ensuring a distribution  of
resources which aims to better equalize  the ability of provinces  to help their poor.  Political
resistance from better off provinces  can be anticipated. It will help if all Vietnamese
understand  well the objectives  of a safety net.
Covariate  Risk
The Contingency  Fund (CF) appears  to have been the only one of Vietnam's poverty
alleviation  and safety net programs specifically  aimed  at providing  insurance  against covariate
risk.  As recognized  by the government,  natural disasters are an important  source of
vulnerability  and impoverishment  for many households  in Vietnam. Although  a complete
accounting  of the economic  and social impacts  of natural disasters is difficult, some statistics
help put into perspective  the degree of devastation  that is wrought. Official  numbers  record
the number of lives lost between 1980 and 1994  due to floods  and typhoons  alone at 6,862.
The annual  losses resulting  from floods in the Red River and Central Coast regions is
estimated  to be around US$130  million. 26 Nevertheless,  none of the initiatives  under the
HEPR specifically  aims at reducing  that vulnerability  or mitigating  the socio-economic  impacts
of natural hazards. 27 Indeed, there is much the government  could do to strengthen  disaster
preparedness,  warning systems,  prevention  and mitigation  systems. 28
On its own, the CF, or the fund that has replaced it, can only help minimize  the
deleterious  effects  of shocks  by introducing  flexibility  and establishing  greater capacity to
respond quickly. However, little is known about its actual performance  in protecting  the poor.
29Once again, it seems  that a large part of the funds are mobilized  locally  with only moderate
input from the center.  Furthermore,  the evidence suggests  that although  post-disaster  relief is
usually forthcoming,  funding  for rehabilitation  and reconstruction  is rarer. 29 Yet, it is also
true that the poorest provinces  tend to experience  some of the most devastating  and frequent
natural disasters. Poverty is likely to increase  in depth and severity if aid amounts are not
sufficie]nt  for full recovery  from shocks. If communes  and households  with already low
reserves are left worse off and responsible  for longer term rebuilding, many are likely to fall
into a chronic state of impoverishment  following  natural catastrophes.  As mentioned  above,
this is also likely  to worsen regional  disparities. The system should  be better geared to
preventing  this from happening. This is an area where the central government  is best
positiorned  to take on the crucial  role of pooling risk and redistributing  assistance  to poorer
provinces  when the need arises. The present financing  arrangements  are probably too
decentralized  to obtain the most out of risk-sharing  nationally. The capacity  to respond
efficiently  to disasters  requires flexible  budgets  that can adapt to yearly variance in the severity
and frequency  of shocks. Given the reality of limited budgets,  the system should  also be
designed  to give priority to the poorest regions and households  within them. Poor provinces
should get relatively  more, holding shocks  and population  size constant. This program is a
key candidate  for generous  funding. Before  channeling  resources  to it, however, a thorough
evaluation  of the existing  program is warranted.
Some  thought should  also go to devising  a separate  policy instrument  for pre-harvest
starvation. This source of vulnerability  is fundamentally  different  in that it can usually be
anticipa.ted.  With time and money, some  damage  prevention  will become  feasible  for both
30types of shock.  Improved irrigation facilities, technological innovation, well-functioning labor
markets, diversification of income sources and higher living standards generally should
eventually conquer the hungry season for most households.  Better construction and building
materials, protective sea dikes, water management networks, the introduction of more resistant
crop strains and early warning systems should also work to attenuate damage from natural
disasters in the longer term.  However, natural disasters will forever periodically and
unexpectedly occur.  A flexible buffer stock of food or cash is a reasonable response to such
an eventuality.
It may also be more cost-effective to stabilize consumption through lean seasons with
different instruments.  In particular, the potential for self-targeted public works schemes
should be explored because they have been useful in preventing famines and sustaining poor
households through lean periods in many countries. 30 They can serve an important insurance
function by reducing the uncertainty faced by the poor that can arise due to uninsurable
variability in their incomes.  The schemes typically provide unskilled manual work on small-
scale rural public works projects, employing people who may have temporarily lost their
income earning sources.  If they are well designed, the advantage of such programs  is that they
are self-targeted in that the choice of whether to participate is left to individuals, and the
schemes can achieve a rapid response to an impending collapse in living standards.  Providing
employment following a shock may not be appropriate.  In general, for this to work there
needs to be scope for unskilled labor intensive rural infrastructure projects in the region; it
must be possible to strategically set the wage level; and the budget and project implementation
must have the flexibility to adapt to sometimes rapid changes in the need for the schemes.
31What's Missing?
A complete  safety  net should  protect the poor from risk as well as help promote them
out of poverty. The majority of Vietnam's poverty alleviation  and safety net policy
interventions  are geared to promotion  rather than  providing insurance  against risk.  Although
many policies  can be thought of as serving both functions,  the system appears on the whole to
be poorly geared  towards helping individuals  who are hit by idiosyncratic  shocks. Protection
from covariate  shocks  may not be functioning  particularly  well either, but recognition of the
problem, and institutions  for addressing  it do exist, as discussed  above. Individuals  and
households  subject to an unexpected  idiosyncratic  shock must rely on their own reserves,
family, friends and community  solidarity. This is a large gap in the current system to which
some  attention  should  be given.
Aknother  area of potential  concern relates to the interhousehold  distribution  of welfare.
The focus of official  poverty measurement  and policy  tends to be the household. Policy design
implicitly  relies on the redistributive  potential  of institutions  such as the family and
community.  This may at times fail women and children. To assume  equitable  treatment within
the household  may not be wise from the point of view of poverty reduction now or in the
future. For example, there is much evidence  of severe child malnutrition  in Vietnam. And
research has demonstrated  the irreversible  damage  that childhood  malnutrition  can cause.
Other than school fee exemptions,  there appear to be relatively few attempts  on the part of the
government  to specifically  target children. This may in part be due to the fact that
international  NGOs have often taken on this role and specialized  in child nutrition projects.
32However, more efforts need to be made to protect children  from poverty and its lifelong
deleterious  consequences.
Mobilizing Resources
More resources are needed for some  types of interventions  and will require even higher
taxation and some reallocation  across  programs. Both options  present difficulties. Households
are taxed-explicitly or otherwise-in a large number  of ways in Vietnam. 3'  In rural areas,
they are expected  to provide up to 10 days of labor per person to build and maintain  local
infrastructure. Additional  "contributions"  are constantly  being mobilized  for one cause or the
other. Very little is known  about the distribution  of the burden of these taxes and how this
varies among  provinces. The existing system  may also impose  high marginal tax rates on poor
people. Households  are removed  from "lists of the poor" if they do too well.  There will be
powerful  incentives  to remain on the registry of poor households. How are such "poverty
traps" avoided? Are there costs to participation  such as stigma  that limit the problem? Do the
local authorities  monitor work effort and how well? This too will become  more difficult with
increased  mobility.
Freeing up resources  by cutting and reallocating  funds faces political  hurdles. Some
current expensive  programs  have strong  political support. For example, questions could be
raised about public spending  for war veterans and invalids. First, more needs to be known
about the living standards  of the beneficiaries. Not all of these households  are likely to be
poor or unable to support themselves. The present system  provides  pecuniary benefits and
bestows  honorary benefits. The latter may be politically  necessary  but relatively cheap. It
33could also provide the basis for introducing  an element  of targeting whereby  transfers would
go prim.arily  to the needy among  those on the lists and medals  to the less needy. Of course,
this wouald  require a method for correctly identifying  the poor.
'The  political  and economic  realities  would also have to be carefully  examined. These
prograrns  and the political and societal  will to support them have become  sacrosanct. Reform
efforts aimed  at, for example,  better targeting  of the poor among  war victims and heros are
unlikely  to make much headway. The collective  belief in the country  's debt to those who
participated  in the national  liberation struggle  is deep-seated,  at least in the present ruling
generation. However, payments  under "veterans  and war invalids"  should eventually  depend
more on individual  circumstances  such that the poorest continue  to receive  the subsidies  longer
than ot]hers. Lastly, if many of those covered  by the war-related  programs are poor, it is
likely that those who similarly  suffered  on the loosing side are likewise in need of assistance.
Information  is needed  to confirm this.  If so, help to this group could be targeted on the basis
of the same indicators,  under a different  policy initiative  if necessary  for political  reasons.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper reviewed  the main sources  of poverty and vulnerability  for households  in
Vietnamn,  the government's  assistance  programs for the poor and vulnerable, and plans for a
new urabrella program. In the absence  of conclusive  evidence  on performance,  costs and
benefits, the paper's assessment  approach  is descriptive  and qualitative. Judgements  about
what s,pecific  interventions  do and do not work in Vietnam's safety net must await careful field
surveys  and rigorous analysis  of impacts. In the meantime,  it is clear that a better poverty
34reduction program and safety net would ensue from the strengthening of institutional structures
and policies, including: 1) national norms for identifying the poor consistently across regions;
2) survey and other instruments with which to consistently measure and monitor local needs
and program performance; 3) integration and coordination between sub-programs with well-
defined and universal rules for implementation at the local level; 4) welfare maximizing
redistribution of resources across space so that everyone is treated equally regardless of where
they reside; and 5) increased resources and attention to helping households and communities
deal with covariate risk.
The government's  new program, the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction
Program (HEPR), does not signify a new policy focus.  It subsumes most existing programs,
and is primarily an attempt to coordinate policy efforts and resources to increase the safety-
net's  cost-effectiveness and performance.  The success of the HEPR depends in large part on
it's  success in transforming the institutional structures and processes which have guided
transfer and safety net provision in the past.  In particular, progress in the areas listed above
could lead to significant improvement in social protection for Vietnam's poor and vulnerable.
While the HEPR concept offers the potential for significant improvements in the safety
net, the Government of Vietnam faces a number of difficult challenges.  The very principles
on which the current highly decentralized, community-based assistance and safety net system
is built are threatened by the emerging market economy.  In particular,  increasing mobility,
without which the market system cannot function, dictates a thorough rethinking of the safety
net's  foundations.  Household mobility renders community level identification and targeting of
the poor less effective and is likely to make the mobilization of community resources for
35helping the poor more difficult.  The high level of decentralization  inhibits  the country's
ability to provide adequate  protection  from covariate  risks, which, in turn, appear to be on the
rise as a result of environmental  destruction. Adequately  addressing  this challenge,  and the
consequently  widening  urban-rural  and regional inequalities,  will require a greater level of risk
pooling nationally. Important  political  hurdles can also be expected in efforts aimed at
reallocating  resources  to better protect Vietnam's poor and vulnerable.
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